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Abstract
We investigate competition for FDI within a region when a foreign multinational
firm can profitably exploit differences in statutory corporate tax rates by shifting
taxable profits to lower-tax jurisdictions. In such framework we show that targeted
tax competition may lead to higher welfare for the region as a whole than lump-sum
subsidies when the difference in statutory corporate tax rates and/or their average
is high enough. Tax competition is also preferable from an efficiency point of view
(overall surplus) by changing the firm’s investment decision when profit shifting
motivations induce the firm to locate in the (before tax) least profitable country.
Keywords: Policy competition for FDI; Profit shifting; Tax discrimination
JEL Classification: H25; H26; H32; H73; F23
∗We wish to thank Giacomo Calzolari, Ronald B. Davies, Rodolphe Desbordes, Marina Di Giacomo,
Jean Hindriks, Giorgia Maffini, Diego Piacentino, Pierre M. Picard, Federico Revelli, Francesca Sanna-
Randaccio, Jacques Thisse, Hylke Vandenbussche, Ian Wooton, as well as seminar participants at the
University of Bologna, at the University of Strathclyde, and at the XXV SIEP Annual Conference for
valuable comments and suggestions.
†ENEA, Lungotevere Thaon di Revel 76, I-00196 Rome, Italy; CORE, Universite´ catholique de
Louvain, Belgium; and Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Universita` di Bologna, Italy. E-mail:
oscar.amerighi@enea.it
‡Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde, Sir William Duncan Building, 130 Rottenrow,
Glasgow G4 0GE, UK; and Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali, Universita` degli Studi di
Pavia. E-mail: giuseppe.defeo@strath.ac.uk
1 Introduction
In recent years governments throughout the world - at the national or sub-national
level - have designed and implemented policies with the aim of attracting foreign direct
investments (FDI). Competition for foreign investments in major production facilities
mostly occurs at an intra-regional level, i.e., between countries belonging to the same
geographic or economic area (e.g., Latin America, South-East Asia, Central and Eastern
Europe) or between regions within the same country. The incentives offered to foreign
investors often consist in corporate tax reductions, tax breaks, tax holidays, investment
tax allowances, or other kinds of specific tax concessions. For instance, during the
1990s, Brazil has experienced several cases of inter-regional competition for FDI in the
automobile sector, and fiscal incentives typically included state and local tax holidays
(for as long as ten years) in addition to tax breaks on imported materials. In Western
Europe, over the last 20 years, Ireland has successfully employed incentive packages
- including a considerable lowering of corporate taxes - to attract FDI. In 1998 the
Czech government, after having lost potential FDI inflows in previous years in favor
of neighboring countries - like Hungary and Poland - eventually approved a package of
incentives including corporate tax relief for ten years for newly-established companies
in the country.1 An example of the way national governments might have to deal
with big foreign investors is represented by the relocation from Austria to Germany of
Sandoz, the generics subsidiary of Switzerland’s drugs maker Novartis, in 2005. This
was the eventual outcome of the company’s unconcealed attempt to exploit “latent
tax competition between Germany, Austria and Switzerland” (“Sandoz seeks more tax-
friendly location”, Financial Times, April 14, 2005).
The relationship between corporate taxation and the location of multinational firms
is an important policy issue and there is general agreement on the idea that national
corporate tax systems should not discriminate between taxation of purely domestic and
of multinational firms. The so-called non-discrimination principle has been recom-
mended by both the European Union and the OECD (European Communities, 1992,
1998; OECD, 1998) to counter harmful tax competition between governments. In this
sense, one of the major attempts worldwide to limit policy competition for FDI is rep-
resented by State Aid Control in the EU. If a Member State lowers the tax rate or
grants other types of tax advantages only to certain sectors or to certain types of firms
(e.g., coordination centers for multinational firms in Belgium) or to enterprises located
in a certain area within the Member State, this would constitute State aid. A proper
implementation of the EU State Aid Control system should thus prevent countries from
offering subsidies in order to attract foreign investors. In spite of that, Vandenbuss-
che and Tan (2005) provide empirical evidence of a more favorable tax treatment for
foreign multinationals compared to similar domestic firms in Belgium. As their results
1All of these examples are taken from Charlton (2003). For an overview of the policy-competition-
for-FDI issue, see Oman (2001).
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are not driven by profit shifting issues, there should exist other fiscal incentives besides
cross-country tax differentials to justify lower tax payments by multinational firms. A
possible interpretation is that the country offers targeted fiscal incentives (in terms of,
e.g., under-the-counter subsidies) to foreign investors.
The empirical research about taxation and foreign investments focuses mainly on how
taxes affect the volume and distribution of FDI.2 But there are also contributions that
analyze more specifically the impact of corporate taxation on firms’ location decisions.3
Devereux and Griffith (1998) find a significant effect of effective average tax rates on
the location choice of subsidiaries of U.S. firms within Europe. On the other hand,
Buettner and Ruf (2007) show that statutory tax rates are at least as important as labor
cost differences for explaining the observed location decisions of German multinationals.
Moreover, the statutory tax rate is found to have a considerably stronger predictive
power than the effective average tax rate, and this “might indicate that multinationals
take account of profit-shifting opportunities in the choice of location of their subsidiaries”
(Buettner and Ruf, 2007, p. 162).
Our paper investigates the effects of policy competition for FDI when the foreign
multinational can strategically react to differences in statutory corporate tax rates and
shift taxable profits to lower-tax jurisdictions. In particular, we aim at understanding
whether it can be welfare-improving for the region as a whole that countries compete
against each other by offering further tax incentives when their national corporate tax
systems already give the multinational some opportunities to minimize its worldwide
tax liabilities.
Our main contribution is to show that, in the presence of profit shifting, targeted
tax competition (i.e. tax breaks) always induces the efficient location choice; i.e., the
one which maximises the sum of regional welfare and firm’s profits. On the contrary
subsidy competition cannot completely offset the distortion created by the difference in
statutory tax rates. Moreover, targeted tax competition might be preferable - in terms
of regional welfare - to lump-sum subsidies as a policy instrument to attract FDI. This
is more likely to be true when the statutory tax rate difference within the region and/or
the average tax rate prevailing in the region are high. Such a result has important
policy implications for, e.g., the European Union, an area characterized by both high
tax levels and differentials. Indeed, it challenges the propriety of the non-discrimination
principle that, by restricting the policy instrument set at the governments’ disposal to
attract FDI, induces countries to compete in a way that might end up lowering regional
welfare.4
2See, e.g., De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) for a survey.
3At the sub-national level, Bartik (1985) shows that the corporate tax rate has a significant impact
on business location decisions within the U.S. Subsequent empirical studies on interregional location
decisions have confirmed this result. See Phillipps and Goss (1995) for a survey.
4Devereux and Loretz (2012) have recently reviewed the empirical literature about competition in
source-based taxes on corporate income. They have found that tax competition appears to be strongest
in the EU with a relevant impetus to downward competition provided by the accession of new small
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The present work is closely related and contributes to two main strands of research:
the literature about policy competition for FDI that has developed from the seminal
contribution by Haufler and Wooton (1999);5 and the literature discussing restrictions
to targeted tax competition (see, e.g., Janeba and Peters, 1999; Keen, 2001; Janeba
and Smart, 2003; Bucovetsky and Haufler, 2008) or the effects of tax coordination
between countries (see, e.g., Huizinga and Nielsen, 2002, and Haufler and Wooton,
2006). The literature about policy competition for FDI typically addresses the questions
as to which one of two asymmetric countries wins the FDI competition and whether the
winner, in equilibrium, taxes or subsidizes the foreign firm. On the other hand, the
contributions on targeted tax competition usually build upon models which take into
account both mobile and immobile tax bases, and, depending on their elasticities, show
that competition may or may not be beneficial in terms of tax revenues. However,
none of these papers takes into account the possibility that multinational firms consider
profist-shifting opportunities when choosing the location of their subsidiaries, and most
of them lack a regional welfare analysis of policy competition.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present and justify the
main assumptions and the structure of the theoretical framework we use to analyze policy
competition for FDI. In Section 3, we analyze a set-up where no profit shifting takes
place and discuss the welfare implications of policy competition. Section 4 introduces
the possibility of profit shifting in response to statutory tax rate differentials. We then
perform an analysis that parallels that of the previous Section and compare the results.
Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main conclusions emerging from this work.
2 The model
We develop a model in which two potential host countries, A and B, belonging to the
same region (be it a political, economic or geographical area) compete between them to
attract investments by a foreign-owned firm from a third-country outside the region -
we call the latter country F and we can think of it as the rest of the world. A typical
example may be the case of multinational firm which, once located in the region, supplies
some final good to the consumers of the whole area. To this end, it must establish a
production facility in either A or B.7
Member States. See also Revelli (2005) for a review of the empirical research on strategic tax interaction
between governments.
5See, e.g., Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) and Ferrett and Wooton (2010a,b).
6Fumagalli (2003) investigates the effects on regional welfare of subsidy competition for FDI when
the location of the multinational firm exerts a positive externality in terms of a technological spillover
to local firms.
7Exports of the final good from country F are not a viable option for the foreign firm if we assume
that trade costs between country F and the region are prohibitively high. On the other hand, assuming
that the costs for intra-regional trade are low enough rules out the possibility that duplicating a costly
investment, i.e. setting up two production plants, one in A and one in B, is a profitable strategy for the
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We want to investigate the effects of policy competition for FDI when the foreign
multinational can strategically react to differences in corporate tax rates and shift tax-
able profits to lower-tax jurisdictions. Hence, we represent policy competition as a
three-stage game with complete information characterized by the following sequence of
decisions:8
• In stage 1, the governments of countries A and B simultaneously and irreversibly
post bids to attract the foreign investor.
• In stage 2, the foreign multinational decides whether to establish its production
plant in A or in B, and realizes profits by serving the regional market.
• In stage 3, the foreign multinational chooses the amount of profits to declare to
the tax authorities of the countries where it operates, that is either A or B, and
F .
We solve our three-stage game by backward induction to find its subgame perfect
equilibrium in pure strategies.We then compare two alternative forms of policy competi-
tion for FDI with the no policy competition scenario where the multinational firm faces
exogenous statutory corporate profit tax rates. Under lump-sum subsidy competition, we
let the two countries compete for FDI by offering lump-sum subsidies Si (i = A,B) to
the foreign multinational, that still faces exogenous statutory tax rates. Under targeted
tax competition, instead, governments are allowed to tax discriminate between firms. In
particular, country i can choose an ad hoc corporate tax rate τi ∈ [0, 1] (i = A,B) that it
will apply just to the profits the multinational firm declares there. The main difference
between subsidy and tax competition is that subsidies are assumed to be lump-sum,
while the tax competition is about setting an ad hoc tax rate on the declared profits
of the firm. Examples of the first type of policy are the cash grants for high-tech firms
used in Chile, or the site preparation grant by the Brazilian State of Rio Grande for the
General Motors investment, while the corporate tax relief for new investments which are
used by several countries (India, Malaysia, Czech Republic, just to mention few cases)
are example of the second type of policy.
We first analyze a situation where declared profits in one country coincide with those
actually realized there. We then discuss the impact of profit shifting opportunities by
allowing for profit misdeclaration when corporate tax rates differ across countries.
foreign firm.
8The game structure is similar to the one used by Bernheim and Whinston (1998) to analyze exclusive
dealing contracts. Differently from their contribution, we restrict the strategy set of the agent (the
foreign multinational) to the choice of only one principal (the country where it will invest). In addition,
we assume complete information for all the agents. A possible extension to our paper could treat the
relative profitability of alternative locations and/or the value of outside options as private information
of the multinational firm.
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2.1 Profits of the multinational firm
We denote by Πi (i = A,B) the before-tax or operating profits that the multinational
firm realizes when it locates its production plant in country i. They represent the profits
that the firm earns by selling the final good to consumers of the whole region and they
may include any kind of fixed and/or variable production costs.
The before-tax profitability of locating in one of the two countries is not the same
from the foreign firm’s perspective. For instance, one country might represent a cheaper
production location than the other or it might ensure an easier access to specific inputs
(e.g., high-skilled workers, raw materials, etc.) for the foreign firm. Similarly, in the
presence of intra-regional trade costs, differences in country - notably, market - size might
be relevant for the firm’s location decision. In what follows, we will assume, without
loss of generality, that country B is the best location for the firm’s production plant in
the absence of tax motivations, i.e. country B benefits from a location advantage over
country A:
Assumption 1 ΠB > ΠA > 0
Assumption 1 further implies that the foreign firm has always an incentive to invest in
the region regardless of any tax incentive offered by the two countries. In such a sense,
ΠA and ΠB may be considered as the extra-profits that the foreign multinational obtains
by locating in the region with respect to some outside option from investing somewhere
else.
Fiscal considerations, however, might play a role in driving the investment decision of
the foreign multinational. As it is common in the literature, we assume that international
corporate taxation follows the source principle, so that profits are taxed where they are
generated.9 To this end, we denote by tA, tB ∈ [0, 1] the statutory corporate tax rates set
by countries A and B, respectively. Similarly, we let country F tax the profits declared
by the multinational firm in its residence country at the rate tF ∈ [0, 1]. These are
the legally imposed rates of corporate taxation which, in principle, should be applied in
order to determine tax liabilities of both domestic and foreign firms operating within
one country’s national borders. To make the analysis of policy competition for FDI
interesting, we assume that country B has a fiscal disadvantage relative to country A:10
Assumption 2 tB > tA
In this way, the foreign multinational always faces a trade-off when deciding in which
country to invest and policy competition might play a role in driving the FDI decision.
We do not make any other specific assumption about the relationship between the
three countries’ statutory tax rates. We want to stress, however, that any tax rate
9Keen (1993), among others, argues that the effective taxation of multinational firms is source-based,
even though tax codes may stipulate differently.
10It should be clear that if country B enjoys both a location and a fiscal advantage over country A,
policy competition cannot turn the latter into a more attractive location for FDI.
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differential creates profit shifting opportunities for the multinational firm. In fact, firms
engaging in horizontal (or vertical) FDI own fiscal entities at different locations and can
shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions in many different ways: for instance,
by manipulating transfer prices on intra-firm traded goods; or by allocating high-interest
debt to high-tax jurisdictions; or even by re-assigning common expenses to affiliates in
high-tax countries. All of these techniques allow a multinational firm to minimize its
worldwide tax bill while imposing significant accounting and other costs on the firm
itself.11
To account for the possibility of profit misdeclaration, we denote by pii and piF the
amount of profits that the multinational firm declares to country i and country F tax
authorities, respectively, and we postulate that they may differ from the profits that the
firm actually realizes at each location, denoted by Πi and ΠF . Our argument is that
the firm has to declare the totality of its worldwide profits, i.e. pii + piF = Πi + ΠF , but
it may choose how to allocate taxable profits across the countries where it operates in
an attempt to minimize its overall tax liabilities. Hence, declared and realized profits in
one country need not coincide. In particular, the amount of profits that the firm shifts
from country i to country F (or the other way around) in response to cross-country tax
rate differentials is given by pis ≡ pii − Πi = ΠF − piF . It is evident that, if the firm
wishes to declare more profits than those actually realized in country i (pii > Πi), it has
to declare less profits than those actually realized in its residence country (piF < ΠF ).
Profit shifting entails some costs, which may involve expected fines or hiring tax
experts in order to conceal any profit misdeclaration from tax authorities. We assume
these costs to be increasing in the difference between realized and declared profits, that
is in the amount of profits that the firm reallocates across the two countries, and we
let them also depend on an exogenous parameter, γ ≥ 0, which might reflect govern-
ments’ intensity in controlling tax avoidance by multinational firms, or, alternatively,
international tax base mobility. More specifically, the costs for profit shifting in either
11The existence of profit shifting - notably, from the United States to low-tax countries (or tax havens)
- is widely documented. See Hines (1999) for a comprehensive survey of the empirical literature on this
issue. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) have provided evidence that profit shifting opportunities exist
among OECD countries as well. More recently, Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) have conducted a
meta-analysis of the empirical literature about the profit-shifting behavior of multinational firms in
both public economics and accounting research. They find a substantial response of profit measures to
international tax rate differentials (i.e., a tax semi-elasticity of subsidiary pre-tax profits of about 0.8).
Moreover, their results suggest that transfer pricing and licensing – rather than financial planning – are
the dominant profit-shifting channels.
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direction, i.e., out of (into) country i into (out of) country F , are given by:12
C (γ,Πi − pii) = γ
2
(Πi − pii)2 , i = A,B.
The objective of the multinational firm is to pick the location which maximizes its
after-tax profits. Since it evaluates both profit shifting opportunities and possible fiscal
incentives when taking such a decision, its after-tax profits from investing in country i
can be written as follows:
Πi = Πi + ΠF − tipii − tF (Πi + ΠF − pii)− γ
2
(Πi − pii)2 + Si, i = A,B (1)
where
• Si = 0 under no subsidy competition;
• Si > 0 under lump-sum subsidy competition (for given statutory tax rates);
• ti = τi and Si = 0 under targeted tax competition.
2.2 Welfare and overall efficiency
We assume that countries A and B have Leviathan governments interested in maxi-
mizing tax revenues and deciding their fiscal policies to attract FDI independently. In
particular, the welfare function maximized by the government of country i when invest-
ment takes place in country j (i, j = A,B) corresponds to net tax revenues and it takes
the following form
W ij =

TRi − Si if i = j
0 otherwise
(2)
where TRi = tipii ≥ 0 denotes the revenue arising from taxation of the profits declared
by the multinational firm to country i’s tax authorities, and Si corresponds to the lump-
sum subsidy paid to attract FDI under subsidy competition.
When we analyse the efficiency of the equilibria we use the sum of regional welfare
and foreign firm’s profits as a measure of the overall surplus generated, that is equal
to pre-tax profits. Therefore, we identify the efficient location choice as the one that
maximises overall surplus which is, by Assumption 1, to invest in country B.
12The profit-shifting cost function we use here is standard in the literature. See, e.g., Swenson (2001),
Kind et al. (2005), Peralta et al. (2006), and Amerighi (2008). As it shall become clear below, such
a cost specification leads to the result that tax motivations make the multinational firm shift the same
amount of profits irrespective of the level of realized profits. If we assumed, instead, following Hines
and Rice (1994) and Huizinga and Laeven (2007), that the costs of profit shifting are proportional to
the ratio of shifted to realized profits, the amount of profit shifting would depend on the level of the
profits realized in the higher-tax country. This, however, does not seem to provide additional insights
into the issue we are interested in. Moreover, it has a major drawback in that we would need to analyze
different tax scenarios depending on how tA and tB compare to tF and between them.
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3 No profit shifting
We first analyze the basic set-up where we assume that the foreign multinational cannot
reallocate taxable profits in response to cross-country tax differentials. Hence, our model
reduces to a two-stage game where the profits declared to one country’s tax authorities
coincide with those earned by operating there, i.e., pii = Πi, i = A,B, F .
In the absence of policy competition for FDI between countries A and B, the foreign
multinational invests in country B if the latter’s location advantage outweighs its fiscal
disadvantage with respect to country A. In particular, FDI goes to country B as long
as the following condition holds:
(1− tB) ΠB > (1− tA) ΠA (3)
Otherwise, tax savings motivations make the foreign firm choose to invest in the least
profitable (before-taxes) location.
We now investigate how policy competition affects the investment decision of the
multinational. To this end, we assume that the location advantage of country B cannot
be so large - relative to its fiscal disadvantage - that this country attracts FDI by
levying a lump-sum tax on the foreign firm’s profits while keeping its corporate tax rate
tB constant:
Assumption 3 (1− tB) ΠB < ΠA
The latter is a sufficient condition to have a positive subsidy paid or a lower tax rate
charged by country B to the foreign firm in the absence of profit shifting. Similarly,
assumptions 1 and 2 ensure that country A cannot win competition for FDI by setting
a lump-sum tax.
We solve our two-stage game by backward induction. At the second (and last) stage,
the multinational firm invests in country B if and only if
(1− tB) ΠB + SB > (1− tA) ΠA + SA
where the values of ti and Si depend on the first-stage policy competition scenario.
Under lump-sum subsidy competition (for given statutory corporate tax rates), the
maximum amount (lump-sum subsidy) that country i is willing to offer to the foreign
investor, Smaxi , consists in the country’s tax revenue from inward FDI. Hence, it is
represented by a full reimbursement of the taxes paid by the multinational firm on
the profits it declares to country i’s tax authorities. That is, in the absence of profit
shifting, Smaxi = tiΠi, i = A,B. The equilibrium subsidy results from an auction where
the country representing the most attractive (subsidy inclusive) location receives the
investment by the foreign firm. However, the winning country need not actually pay its
maximum subsidy but just the one which is necessary to outbid the rival country, which
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is given by S∗i ≡ (1− tj) Πj +Smaxj − (1− ti) Πi, i, j = A,B, i 6= j.13 Therefore, if both
governments bid their maximum subsidy to attract FDI, country B wins the auction
and investment takes place there if and only if
(1− tB) ΠB + SmaxB > (1− tA) ΠA + SmaxA ⇐⇒ ΠB > ΠA (4)
which always holds by Assumption 1. This implies that, in the absence of profit shifting,
lump-sum subsidy competition cancels out country B’s fiscal disadvantage relative to
A, thereby inducing the foreign firm to set up its production plant there. In this case,
the equilibrium subsidy is given by
S∗B = ΠA − (1− tB) ΠB, (5)
with S∗B > 0 by Assumption 3.
Under targeted tax competition, governments choose the rate τi at which the multi-
national firm’s declared profits are taxed. Country A’s best offer to the foreign firm
is represented by the possibility of not paying taxes at all there, i.e., by τA = 0. For
country B to attract FDI, its offer has to outbid country A’s best offer. The problem
of country B’s government can then be written as follows:
max
τB
τBpiB
s.t. (1− τB) ΠB ≥ ΠA
where piB = ΠB as, for the time being, we assume that the firm cannot misdeclare the
profits actually realized at each location. If the constraint were not binding, there would
be no real competition for FDI between the two countries. Then, as we are not interested
in cases where policy competition resolves into a new tax instrument for country B, the
solution comes from the constraint holding with equality, which gives
τ∗B = 1−
ΠA
ΠB
∈ (0, 1) . (6)
Therefore, country B always wins the competition for FDI by fully extracting the foreign
firm’s location gain from investing there, ΠB −ΠA > 0.
Once the equilibria under no policy, subsidy and tax competition have been char-
acterized we can analyse whether competition to attract FDI is wasteful for the region
as a whole. In the first instance, we argue that whenever policy competition does not
change the investment decision of the foreign multinational, regional welfare is always
lower than in the no policy competition scenario. In fact, we want to focus on situations
where both countries could potentially receive FDI, hence they actually have to compete
13The same equilibrium outcome arises if we assume Bertrand price competition between countries.
We provide a more general and formal definition of the equilibrium of the policy-competition-for-FDI
games in the Appendix.
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against each other to affect the firm’s choice. Under no policy competition, if the multi-
national chooses to invest in country B, regional welfare is given by WRB,No = tBΠB.
Under lump-sum subsidy competition, country B always succeeds in attracting FDI but
regional welfare decreases to WRB,Sub = tBΠB−S∗B = ΠB−ΠA < WRB,No since S∗B > 0 by
Assumption 3. Similarly, under targeted tax competition, regional welfare is equivalent
to the lump-sum subsidy competition scenario, thus lower than without competition.
Absent policy competition and profit shifting, however, the firm might choose to
invest in the fiscally-advantageous country A in order to save on tax payments. If
this were the case, both forms of policy competition may increase regional welfare by
making the multinational invest in the location-advantageous country B. If the increase
in overall surplus generated by the efficient location choice is larger that the loss of
resources due to policy competition, there is room for increasing welfare for the region
as a whole. The following proposition summarises the results of this section.
Proposition 1 Assume that there are no profit shifting opportunities for a multina-
tional firm willing to invest in one of the countries competing to attract FDI. In the
presence of different statutory corporate tax rates, lump-sum subsidy and targeted tax
competition are equivalent and restore the efficiency of the firm’s location choice. Fur-
thermore, when the difference in statutory corporate tax rate within the region is suf-
ficiently large, the region as a whole benefits from policy competition for FDI between
countries.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The main message is that, in the absence of profit shifting, large differentials in
statutory corporate tax rates between the two countries may drive the FDI decision of
the multinational firm in a way which does not maximize welfare for the region as a
whole. In this case, allowing countries to compete for FDI may increase regional welfare
since policy competition makes the firm invest in the most profitable (before-taxes)
location.
In the next Section, we investigate whether the potentially positive impact of policy
competition for FDI and the equivalence between the different fiscal policies we analyze
are robust to profit shifting by the multinational firm in response to tax rate differentials.
4 Profit shifting
We now investigate a set-up where the foreign multinational is able to shift, at some cost,
taxable profits to low-tax jurisdictions in response to cross-country tax differentials. To
this end, we solve by backward induction the three-stage game described at the beginning
of Section 2 to find its Subgame perfect equilibrium.
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4.1 Stage 3: profit declaration
At the last stage of the game, the foreign multinational chooses the amount of profits
to declare to the tax authorities of the countries where it operates, that is either A or
B, and F . When taking such a decision, the firm observes the statutory corporate tax
rates in country i (i = A,B) and country F , the fiscal incentives offered by countries A
and B if policy competition occurs, and the level of before-tax profits it can realises in
the chose location. The firm then chooses the amount of profits to declare to country i’s
tax authorities, pii, in order to maximize its after-tax profits. This, in turn, determines
the level of declared profits in country F , piF .
The objective function of the MNE, as defined in (1), is the sum of the after-tax
profits in country F and in the chosen location. Optimizing with respect to pii, we obtain
pii = Πi − ti − tF
γ
and piF = ΠF +
ti − tF
γ
(7)
from which it follows that no profit misdeclaration takes place when countries i and
F tax corporate profits at the same rate. However, for any ti 6= tF , the multinational
always declares higher profits than those actually realized in the lower-tax country and
lower profits in the higher-tax country. Note also that any kind of lump-sum subsidy set
by countries A and B does not affect the multinational firm’s profit declaration choice.
Since we do not want the firm to declare negative profits in the high-tax country, which
would otherwise subsidize it at the prevailing statutory corporate tax rate, we assume
that profit shifting is costly enough, i.e.
γ >
|ti − tF |
min {Πi,ΠF } , i = A,B. (8)
In what follows, we call (8) the non-negative-profit-declaration condition.
4.2 Stage 2: FDI decision
At the second stage, the foreign multinational chooses whether to establish its production
plant in country A or in country B, and, depending on its investment decision, realizes
profits ΠA or ΠB. At this stage of the game, the firm takes the fiscal policies of the two
countries as given and invests in the country where it earns larger after-tax profits.
Using the firm’s objective function (1), where we substitute for stage-3 optimal
declared profits (7), and rearranging terms, the multinational’s after-tax profits from
investing in country i and shifting profits out of (or into) country F under the policy
competition scenario k ∈ {No, Sub, Tax} can be rewritten as14
Πi,k = (1− ti) Πi + (1− tF ) ΠF + Si + (ti − tF )
2
2γ
, i = A,B (9)
14The terms No, Sub, and Tax stand for no policy, lump-sum subsidy and targeted tax competition,
respectively.
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where the last term represents the net gain to shift taxable profits from the high-tax to
the low-tax country in response to any tax differential between them.
No policy competition
If countries A and B do not compete to attract FDI (Si = 0, i = A,B), the foreign
multinational invests in country B as long as the following condition holds:
(1− tB) ΠB +
(tB − tA)
(
t− tF
)
γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
relative PS gain/loss
> (1− tA) ΠA (10)
where t ≡ tA+tB2 is the average statutory corporate tax rate in the region and PS is an
acronym for profit shifting.
A comparison of (10) with the corresponding condition in the absence of profit shift-
ing, i.e., condition (3), suggests that, for a given tB > tA, profit shifting opportunities
may turn the fiscally-disadvantageous country B into a relatively more (less) attractive
location for the foreign firm’s investment when the average tax rate prevailing in the re-
gion is higher (lower) than the residence country’s tax rate. In particular, when t > tF ,
the multinational finds relatively more interesting to invest in the higher-tax country as
profit shifting (towards country F) partially offsets country B’s fiscal disadvantage. Oth-
erwise, when t < tF , profit shifting opportunities work in favor of the lower-tax country.
Stated differently, if profit shifting goes out of (into) the region, the country setting
the higher (the lower) corporate tax rate becomes, ceteris paribus, more attractive. In
spite of that, in the presence of profit shifting, larger tax differentials always make the
fiscally-advantageous country A more profitable from the foreign firm’s perspective as
the gain from shifting profits out of the high-tax country cannot compensate for the cost
of paying taxes there. Then, condition (10) is less likely to hold.15
Lump-sum subsidy competition
Under lump-sum subsidy competition (for given statutory corporate tax rates), coun-
tries A and B offer lump-sum subsidies that affect the relative profitability of the two
alternative locations. In particular, when each country bids its maximum subsidy, Smaxi
(i = A,B), the foreign multinational invests in country B if and only if
(1− tB) ΠB +
(tB − tA)
(
t− tF
)
γ
+ SmaxB > (1− tA) ΠA + SmaxA (11)
Targeted tax competition
15This can be easily seen by differentiating (10) with respect to tA or tB and recalling the non-negative-
profit-declaration condition (8).
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Under targeted tax competition, countries A and B compete over tax rates, τi, and
the foreign multinational invests in country B as long as
(1− τB) ΠB + (τB − τA) (τ − tF )
γ
> (1− τA) ΠA (12)
where τ ≡ τA+τB2 is the average ad hoc corporate tax rate of the two countries. The tax
rate τi results from the optimization problem of country i, which we analyze - together
with lump-sum subsidy competition - in the next subsection.
4.3 Stage 1: policy competition for FDI
At the first stage, the governments of countries A and B simultaneously and irreversibly
post bids to attract the foreign investor. The objective of each country’s government is
to maximize the national welfare gain from receiving FDI as given by (2).
No policy competition
Under no policy competition, the two countries do not offer any tax incentive to
the foreign multinational. Hence, the firm takes its investment decision according to
condition (10) and the equilibrium values of regional welfare and firm’s after-tax profits
are defined as follows. When FDI goes to country A:
WRA,No = tApiA = tAΠA −
tA (tA − tF )
γ
(13)
ΠA,No = (1− tA) ΠA + (1− tF ) ΠF + (tF − tA)
2
2γ
, (14)
while when FDI goes to country B:
WRB,No = tBpiB = tBΠB −
tB (tB − tF )
γ
(15)
ΠB,No = (1− tB) ΠB + (1− tF ) ΠF + (tF − tB)
2
2γ
. (16)
Lump-sum subsidy competition
Under lump-sum subsidy competition, the maximum subsidy country i is willing
and able to offer is represented by a full reimbursement of the taxes paid on the profits
declared by the firm to country i’s tax authorities, that is, Smaxi = tipii (i = A,B). Since
profit shifting allows the firm to misdeclare realized profits at each location in response
to tax rate differentials, the maximum subsidies bid by countries A and B are given by
SmaxA = tA
(
ΠA − tA − tF
γ
)
and SmaxB = tB
(
ΠB − tB − tF
γ
)
(17)
where we replace pii with stage-3 optimal declared profits as defined in (7).
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Substituting for the two countries’ maximum subsidies (17) in equation (11) and
rearranging terms, we can show that, with subsidy competition, FDI can go to country
A, which is the inefficient location. In fact only when
ΠB −ΠA > (tB − tA) t
γ
(18)
subsidy competition induces the multinational to invest in country B, which occurs when
profit shifting motivations are less important for the firm than the location advantage of
setting up a production plant there. In the presence of profit shifting, indeed, lump-sum
subsidy competition cannot offset country B’s fiscal disadvantage relative to A. The
following Proposition summarises the result.
Proposition 2 If the multinational firm can use profit shifting opportunities to mini-
mize its worldwide tax liabilities, (lump-sum) subsidy competition does not always induce
the efficient allocation.
When condition (18) holds, country B wins the competition for FDI. In equilibrium,
however, it does not need to pay its maximum subsidy but just the one which is necessary
to outbid its competitor. Hence, the equilibrium subsidy country B pays to attract FDI
in the presence of profit shifting opportunities for the firm amounts to
S˜∗B = S
∗
B +
2tBtF − t2B − t2A
2γ
where S∗B is country B’s equilibrium subsidy in the absence of profit shifting as defined
in (5). Thus, depending on statutory corporate tax rates, S˜∗B can be either higher
or lower than S∗B. In particular, if the multinational is interested in shifting taxable
profits into the region (tF > tA, tB) or simply to the lower-tax country (tB > tF > tA),
the subsidy country B has to pay to attract the foreign investor is higher than without
profit shifting, i.e. S˜∗B > S
∗
B. Otherwise, for tA, tB > tF , the multinational finds it
relatively more profitable to invest in the higher-tax country as it can now shift taxable
profits out of the region, which leads to S˜∗B < S
∗
B.
The discussion above allows us to conclude that, in the presence of profit shifting,
both countries can win subsidy competition for FDI. If country B attracts the foreign
investor, regional welfare is equal to
WRB,Sub = tBpiB − S˜∗B = ΠB −ΠA −
(tB − tA) t
γ
and, substituting for S˜∗B into equation (9), the multinational’s after-tax profits from
investing in country B and shifting profits out of (or into) country F are given by
ΠB,Sub = ΠA + (1− tF ) ΠF + t
2
F − t2A
2γ
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On the other hand, if it is country A that receives FDI, regional welfare is given by
WRA,Sub = tApiA − S˜∗A =
(tB − tA) t
γ
− (ΠB −ΠA) = −WRB,Sub
where S˜∗A = ΠB− (1− tA) ΠA+ 2tAtF−t
2
B−t2A
2γ is derived in the same way as S˜
∗
B. It is then
immediate to compute the multinational’s after-tax profits from investing in country A
and shifting profits out of (or into) country F by replacing S˜∗A into equation (9):
ΠA,Sub = ΠB + (1− tF ) ΠF + t
2
F − t2B
2γ
Targeted tax competition
Under targeted tax competition, the two governments compete over the ad hoc tax
rate τi at which the multinational firm’s declared profits are taxed. The problem of
country B’s government is given by
max
τB
τBpiB
s.t. (1− τB) ΠB + (τB − τA) (τ − tF )
γ
≥ (1− τA) ΠA
with piB = ΠB − τB−tFγ from (7). The following Proposition defines the solution to the
optimization problem of country B.
Proposition 3 When the multinational firm can use profit shifting opportunities to
minimize its worldwide tax liabilities, targeted tax competition always induces the effi-
cient location choice. Furthermore country B wins the tax competition game by bidding
an ad hoc tax rate
τˆB = γΠB + tF −
√
(γΠB + tF )
2 − 2γ (ΠB −ΠA) (19)
which is always increasing in ΠB.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for the first part of the Proposition 3 is simple. When the two countries’
governments are allowed to choose an ad hoc corporate tax rate for the foreign investor’s
profits, the distortions introduced by statutory tax rate differentials and by the profit
shifting behavior of the multinational firm can be eliminated. Then, the country where
the firm may enjoy the largest (before-tax) profits always wins the competition for FDI.16
16This reminds us the well-known result in the IO literature on vertical product differentiation ac-
cording to which if a high and a low quality good are offered at the same price, then all consumers will
buy the high quality good (see, e.g., Pepall et al., 2008). Here, absent tax distortions, country B will
benefit from a higher intrinsic quality relative to country A because of its location advantage.
15
The second result suggests that the larger the before-tax profitability from investing
in B (due to, e.g., a larger market size relative to A),the lower the incentive to tax
discriminate in favor of MNE, i.e., the higher the tax rate that country B bids to
attract the foreign investor.
Hence, in equilibrium, country B always wins the competition for FDI by setting a
positive tax rate on the foreign firm’s declared profits. Regional welfare is then given by
WRB,Tax = W
B
B = ΠB −ΠA −
τˆ2B
2γ
and it represents the marginal contribution of country B to aggregate welfare (or total
surplus), defined as the unweighted sum of regional welfare and the firm’s after-tax
profits.17 In fact, such a contribution corresponds to the location advantage of B over
A, ΠB −ΠA, minus the loss in terms of overall potential gains from profit shifting, that
is,
[
tF
tF−τˆB
γ − (tF−τˆB)
2
2γ
]
−
[
tF
tF
γ −
t2F
2γ
]
= − τˆ2B2γ .
The equilibrium profit for the multinational firm is:
ΠB,Tax = (1− τˆB) ΠB + (1− tF ) ΠF + (τˆB − tF )
2
2γ
4.4 Regional welfare implications
In this Section, we evaluate the welfare impact of profit shifting by the foreign multi-
national investing in the region. In particular, we investigate whether the introduction
of policy competition may enhance regional welfare by changing the foreign firm’s in-
vestment decision. Moreover, we show under which conditions targeted tax competition
(hence, tax discrimination) has to be preferred to lump-sum subsidy competition.
It is easy to check that, in the presence of profit shifting, subsidy and tax competition
are no longer equivalent since the former may not be able to induce the firm to make
the efficient FDI choice. When countries compete over tax rates, country A offers a
tax holiday to the foreign firm whereas country B proposes an ad hoc tax rate that is
positive due to its location advantage. The foreign firm takes into account the possibility
of shifting taxable profits to the tax-preferred jurisdiction when deciding where to set up
its production plant. Hence, it will optimally shift into the lower-tax country as much
of its profits as it can. In equilibrium, country B will be able to set a tax rate which
always induces the foreign firm to invest there. However, the firm cannot fully enjoy the
location specific rents from locating in B because of the loss in terms of profit shifting.
On the other hand, lump-sum subsidy competition does not affect profit declaration and
profit shifting motivations play a decisive role for the FDI choice.
17Our results can be easily interpreted in the light of the common agency literature since our model
considers two principals (the two governments) that submit offers to a common agent (the foreign
investor). In particular, Chiesa and Denicolo` (2009) show that in a common agency game with two prin-
cipals and complete information, each principal’s payoff corresponds exactly to its marginal contribution
to social surplus even when we relax the assumption of truthful strategies.
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To investigate the effects on regional welfare of policy competition for FDI in the
presence of profit shifting, we assume that either form of competition always decreases
regional welfare when it does not change the multinational firm’s investment decision:
Assumption 4 WRi,k < W
R
i,No, k ∈ {Sub, Tax}
This allows us to exclude from the analysis the cases where policy competition resolves
into a new tax instrument for the host country and to focus on situations where com-
petition for FDI actually takes place as both countries represent profitable locations
(either before or after taxes) for the firm. Assumption 4 thus implies that under lump-
sum subsidy competition, both countries have to pay positive equilibrium subsidies to
attract FDI; or under tax competition, the cost for country B of lowering the corporate
tax rate on the foreign firm’s profits cannot compensate for the gain from partial rent
extraction.
For country B, Assumption 4 implies that WRB,No > W
R
B,Sub and W
R
B,No > W
R
B,Tax.
For country A, instead, we have that WRA,No > W
R
A,Sub as tax competition cannot induce
the firm to invest there. Note also that, differentiating (14) with respect to tA, we obtain
that
∂WRA,No
∂tA
> 0 if and only if γ > 2tA−tFΠA .
18 Since tB > tA by Assumption 2, a lower tA,
for a given tB, increases the tax difference between them and, if γ is high enough, i.e,
if profit shifting is sufficiently costly, it decreases regional welfare from FDI to A under
no policy competition.
We want to show that policy competition may increase regional welfare by changing
the firm’s FDI decision. In particular, we compare WRB,Sub with W
R
A,No. The latter
is the best situation for the region as a whole when FDI goes to A, and, for this to
happen, the multinational has to find it profitable to invest in country A in the absence
of policy competition, i.e., ΠA,No > ΠB,No must hold. It is also easy to check that the
welfare of country B - hence, of the region - corresponds to the marginal contribution
of country B to aggregate welfare, and it can thus be defined as the difference between
aggregate welfare when the firm invests in B and when it invests in A, i.e., WRB,Sub =
WRB,No+ Π
B,No−
(
WRA,No + Π
A,No
)
. Therefore, provided that ΠA,No > ΠB,No, regional
welfare increases as a result of subsidy competition as long as
WRB,No > Π
A,No −ΠB,No + 2WRA,No
which is more likely to be true when the relative after-tax profitability from investing in
A over B essentially depends on a low statutory corporate tax rate tA or on an important
difference between tA and tB. Indeed, a lower tA increases Π
A,No but, if profit shifting
is costly enough, it simultaneously reduces tax revenues (hence, regional welfare from
FDI to A). This allows us to claim
18If tF < tA, the firm shifts taxable profits to country F and W
R
A,No increases with tA if and only if γ
is high enough, meaning that profit shifting is limited by its cost. If tF > 2tA, W
R
A,No always increases
with tA since tF is so high that γ becomes negligible. Finally, if tF ∈ (tA, 2tA), the firm shifts taxable
profits to country A, which can increase its tax revenue by increasing tA as long as γ is high enough.
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Proposition 4 In the presence of profit shifting, lump-sum subsidy competition for FDI
may be beneficial to the region if the difference in statutory corporate tax rates within
the region is large enough.
In fact, for a sufficiently large statutory tax rate difference, we know that the multina-
tional firm prefers to invest in the fiscally-advantageous country A absent policy com-
petition. But as we let this difference increase further - by decreasing tA, for a given tB
- regional welfare from FDI to A may decrease. Hence, lump-sum subsidy competition
may be regional-welfare improving since it induces the firm to invest in the location-
advantageous country B. This is true provided that profit shifting is so costly that a
reduction in tA does not allow country A to increase the revenue it can collect by taxing
the multinational firm’s profits.
Lastly, we want to demonstrate that, in the presence of profit shifting, targeted tax
competition might be more desirable than subsidy competition as a policy instrument to
attract FDI. To this end, we need to compare WRB,Tax and W
R
B,Sub, notably the impact
of profit shifting under the two policies, which would otherwise be equivalent. It is then
straightforward to show that
WRB,Tax > W
R
B,Sub ⇐⇒ τˆB ∈
(
0,
√
(tA − tB) (tA + tB)
)
since τˆB cannot be negative. Such a condition is more likely to hold the higher the
statutory corporate tax rate difference or the sum (i.e., the average) of tax rates or both
are. We can thus state
Proposition 5 In the presence of profit shifting, targeted tax competition is more likely
to yield higher regional welfare than lump-sum subsidy competition for FDI when the
difference in statutory corporate tax rates within the region and/or the average statutory
corporate tax rate prevailing in the region are large enough.
To understand why this is so, we just need to look at regional welfare from FDI to
country B under subsidy competition, WRB,Sub = ΠB − ΠA − (tB−tA)tγ , since regional
welfare under tax competition, WRB,Tax, does not depend on the statutory corporate tax
rates tA and tB. We know that W
R
B,Sub represents country B’s marginal contribution
to aggregate welfare, where the latter is defined as the sum of regional welfare and the
firm’s after-tax profits, thereby excluding country F . For a given average statutory
tax rate in the region t, a larger difference (tB − tA) decreases country B’s marginal
contribution since the amount of taxable profits the multinational firm shifts into the
region shrinks (or, similarly, profit shifting to the residence country F gets larger). On
the other hand, for a given statutory tax rate difference within the region (tB − tA), a
higher average tax rate t lowers country B’s marginal contribution because a symmetric
increase in statutory tax rates - that keeps the difference between them constant - has a
negative effect on aggregate welfare and such an effect is stronger for the country with
the higher statutory tax rate.
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5 Concluding remarks
The phenomenon of competition for FDI is pervasive and mostly takes place between
countries belonging to the same geographic, political or economic area. The incentives
offered to foreign investors often consist in tax holidays or other kinds of specific tax
concessions. Moreover, the empirical evidence seems to suggest that multinational firms
might consider profit shifting opportunities when deciding the location of their foreign
subsidiaries. In order to counter what policymakers label harmful tax competition
between governments, the non-discrimination principle has been strongly advocated by
both the European Union and the OECD. This should prevent countries from offering
targeted fiscal incentives to attract foreign investors. But there is empirical evidence to
the contrary.
The objective of this paper has been to investigate the impact on regional welfare
of policy competition for FDI when a foreign multinational can strategically react to
differences in statutory corporate tax rates and shift taxable profits to lower-tax juris-
dictions. In particular, we have tried to understand whether it can be welfare-improving
for the region as a whole that countries compete against each other by offering further
tax incentives when their national corporate tax systems already give the multinational
some opportunities to minimize its worldwide tax liabilities. To this end, we have set
up a model of policy competition for FDI between two countries belonging to the same
region, and we have assumed that one country has a location advantage but a fiscal
disadvantage relative to the other one.
If we rule out profit shifting opportunities, any form of policy competition elim-
inates tax distortions and induces the foreign multinational to invest in the location-
advantageous country. Moreover, when the statutory tax rate difference is large enough,
policy competition increases regional welfare by changing the investment decision of the
firm. On the other hand, when we take profit shifting opportunities into account, sub-
sidy competition can no longer offset tax distortions. Then, profit shifting motivations
may induce the firm to invest in the fiscally-advantageous country. By contrast, targeted
tax competition cancels out the distortions arising from statutory tax rate differentials
and induces the foreign firm to choose the most efficient location for its investment.
In spite of that, lump-sum subsidy competition may still be regional-welfare-improving
when the statutory tax rate difference is large enough.
Our main contribution has been to prove that, in the presence of profit shifting,
targeted tax competition might be preferable - in terms of regional welfare - to lump-
sum subsidy competition as a policy instrument to attract FDI. This is more likely to
be true when the statutory tax rate difference within the region and/or the average tax
rate prevailing in the region are high. Such a result has important policy implications
for, e.g., the European Union, an area characterized by both high tax levels and high
tax differentials. Indeed, it challenges the propriety of the non-discrimination principle.
This principle, by restricting the policy instrument set at the governments’ disposal to
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attract FDI, induces countries to compete in a way that might end up lowering regional
welfare. In this context, tax discrimination, i.e., a policy which is more able to adjust
to the profit shifting activities of multinational firms, might lead to larger benefits than
lump-sum subsidy competition.
We conclude with two remarks on our modeling choices. First, we restrict attention
to tax instruments to attract FDI. This is because we want to focus on policies that
affect profit declaration by the multinational firm, hence its profit shifting ability in
response to the fiscal incentives offered by competing countries. To this end, we do
not let governments choose, e.g., the level of public infrastructure (roads, bridges, rail
connections, airports, etc.) supplied to the firm. This, however, might be somehow
captured by the exogenous difference in before-tax profitability between the two locations
as long as we consider infrastructure as a local public good, whose benefits can be enjoyed
by the firm only by locating in the country where the investment has been made.19
Second, our set-up is characterized by complete information, i.e., the economic agents
(the governments and the multinational firm) know everything they need to know to
take the decisions which maximize their payoffs. But there are several ways to introduce
asymmetric information in our framework.20 For instance, by assuming that the foreign
multinational possesses private information on its outside option from not investing in
the region. That is, the two governments just have some common expectations about
the profitability of an alternative location outside the region for the foreign multina-
tional. If governments are not able to elicit information from the firm, however, the
uncertainty about the value of such an outside option simply resolves into a further
constraint that they may have to take into account when competing for FDI. A more
interesting situation, instead, occurs when the fiscal policy of the host country indirectly
affects the value of the outside option. If, for example, the outside option of the foreign
multinational is given by the possibility of not investing abroad, operating just in its
residence country and paying taxes at some unknown rate there, profit shifting creates
a link between the fiscal policies of the residence and of the host country. Hence, the
host country might be able to design a fiscal policy which induce truthful revelation by
the foreign firm. But this goes beyond the scope of our model and represents a task for
future research.
19In general, when countries face a set of firms heterogeneous with respect to their infrastructure
needs, they have an incentive to differentiate to the maximum extent as this allows them to reduce the
dissipation of welfare resulting from subsequent tax competition. In such a sense, infrastructure compe-
tition can relax tax competition in the same way as product differentiation can relax price competition
between firms. Hindiks et al. (2008), however, show that the opposite result may hold under revenue
sharing when countries are heterogeneous ex ante in their capacity to attract capital. In particular,
countries strategically choose to under-invest in public infrastructure as they anticipate that public in-
vestments, by enhancing the productivity of capital, will exacerbate subsequent capital tax competition.
See Dembour (2008) for a recent survey of the literature about tax and infrastructure competition.
20Bond and Samuelson (1986), e.g., analyze a situation where the firm is uncertain as to the produc-
tivity of the country where it will potentially invest, and show that tax holidays are an optimal means
by which high-productivity countries can reveal their type.
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Appendix
No profit shifting
Policy-competition-for-FDI equilibrium
Under lump-sum subsidy competition, if condition (4) holds, country A can never suc-
ceed in attracting FDI even by bidding its maximum lump-sum subsidy SmaxA . On the
other hand, if condition (4) does not hold, it is country B that can never win the compe-
tition for FDI. Hence, the subsidy-competition-for-FDI game between countries A and
B is a Bertrand-competition-like game in prices with multiple equilibria. In particular,
the equilibrium can be defined as follows:
S∗i = , with  ∈ (0, Smaxi )
S∗j : Π
j(S∗j ) = Π
i (Smaxi ) , for i, j = A,B, i 6= j
The proof is a straightforward application of the Bertrand-competition solution. Indeed,
depending on condition (4), one of the two countries, say country i, can never attract
the foreign investor. For country i, any bid  ∈ (0, Smaxi ) is a best reply to country
j’s equilibrium strategy since its own payoff is always equal to zero. For country j,
any other strategy S′j < S
∗
j is not an equilibrium strategy since country i will have the
opportunity of attracting FDI by setting Smaxi , which would imply Π
i (Smaxi ) > Π
j(S′j).
By contrast, any other strategy S′j > S
∗
j is not a best reply to S
∗
i because it leaves to
the foreign firm an extra-benefit that country j could extract.
Under targeted tax competition, the problem of country i’s government can be gen-
erally formulated in the following way:
max
ti(pii)
ti (pii)
s.t. Πi − ti (pii) ≥ Πj − tj (pij) , i, j = A,B, i 6= j
where the fiscal policy implemented by country i, ti (pii), is a function of the profits the
multinational firm declares to country i’s tax authorities.
The policy-competition-for-FDI game between countries A and B is a Bertrand-
competition-like game in prices with multiple equilibria. In particular, the equilibrium
can be defined as follows
t∗A (piA) = , with  ∈ (0,∞)
t∗B (piB) = ΠB −ΠA
The proof is a straightforward application of the Bertrand-competition solution. Indeed,
for country A, any  ∈ (0,∞) is a best reply to country B’s equilibrium strategy since
A’s payoff is always nil, i.e., it can never attract the foreign investor. For country B, any
other strategy t′B (·) such that t′B (·) > ΠB−ΠA > 0 is not an equilibrium strategy since
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country A will have the opportunity of attracting FDI by setting t∗A (·) =  < t′B (·). By
contrast, any other strategy t′B (·) < ΠB − ΠA is not a best reply to t∗A (·) because it
leaves money on the table, i.e., to the foreign multinational firm.
Proof of Proposition 1
When (1− tA) ΠA > (1− tB) ΠB, the foreign multinational invests in country A in the
absence of policy competition and regional welfare is given by WRA = tAΠA. Competition
between countries changes the FDI decision of the foreign multinational and regional
welfare amounts to WRB = ΠB−ΠA. We want to show that ΠB−ΠA > tAΠA may hold,
in which case policy competition increases regional welfare. For this to be possible, two
conditions have to be satisfied:
(i) the foreign investor chooses to invest in country A in the absence of policy com-
petition if and only if
ΠB <
1− tA
1− tBΠA
that is if the gain in before-tax profits from investing in B cannot compensate for
the fiscal disadvantage of operating in the high-tax country;
(ii) regional welfare increases if and only if
ΠB > (1 + tA) ΠA
Therefore, policy competition increases regional welfare by inducing the firm to invest in
the location-advantageous country if and only if the last two conditions simultaneously
hold, that is if and only if
1− tA
1− tB > 1 + tA ⇐⇒ tB > tˆB (tA) ≡
2tA
1 + tA
≥ tA
For tB ∈
[
tA, tˆB
)
, policy competition decreases regional welfare, whereas the opposite
holds true for tB ∈
(
tˆB, 1
)
.
Profit shifting
Lump-sum subsidy competition
If country B’s location advantage is more important for the foreign firm than profit
shifting opportunities, i.e., condition (18) holds, country A can never succeed in attract-
ing FDI even by bidding its maximum lump-sum subsidy SmaxA . On the other hand,
if condition (18) does not hold, it is country B that can never win the competition
for FDI. Hence, similarly to the no-profit-shifting case, the equilibrium of the subsidy-
competition-for-FDI game between countries A and B can be defined as follows
S∗i = , with  ∈ (0, Smaxi )
S˜∗j : Π
j(S˜∗j ) = Π
i (Smaxi ) , for i, j = A,B, i 6= j
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The proof is once again a straightforward application of the Bertrand-competition solu-
tion. Indeed, depending on condition (18), one of the two countries, say country i, can
never attract the foreign investor. For country i, any bid  ∈ (0, Smaxi ) is a best reply to
country j’s equilibrium strategy since i’s payoff is always equal to zero. For country j,
any other strategy S′j < S˜
∗
j is not an equilibrium strategy since country i will have the
opportunity of attracting FDI by setting Smaxi , which would imply Π
i (Smaxi ) > Π
j(S′j).
By contrast, any other strategy S′j > S˜
∗
j is not a best reply to S
∗
i because it leaves to
the foreign firm an extra-benefit that country j could extract.
Targeted tax competition
Proof of Proposition 3
Under tax competition, governments compete over the rate τi at which the multinational
firm’s declared profits are taxed. The problem of country B’s government is given by
max
τB
τBpiB
s.t. (1− τB) ΠB + (τB − τA) (τ − tF )
γ
≥ (1− τA) ΠA
where piB = ΠB− τB−tFγ from (7). Since we are dealing with a single-variable maximiza-
tion problem with one constraint, the solution is either an unconstrained maximum -
resulting from the maximization of the objective function without the constraint - or it
comes from the constraint itself, which is binding. But if the constraint is not binding,
there is no real competition for FDI between countries and the latter resolves into a
new tax instrument for country B. Hence, we just consider the binding situation and
we define
f (τA, τB) ≡ (1− τB) ΠB + (τB − τA) (τ − tF )
γ
− (1− τA) ΠA = 0
so that the solution to country B’s problem is given by
τ∗B (τA) = γΠB + tF ±
√
(γΠB + tF )
2 + τA (τA − 2tF )− 2γ [ΠB − (1− τA) ΠA]
which, given country A’s best offer to the foreign firm, i.e., τA = 0, reduces to
τˆB ≡ τ∗B (0) = γΠB + tF ±
√
(γΠB + tF )
2 − 2γ (ΠB −ΠA)
Note that f (·, ·) is a convex function of τB which is increasing for τB > γΠB + tF . If
the two roots that we have just defined do not exist, this means that f (·, ·) > 0, i.e.,
the after-tax profits from investing in B always exceed those from investing in A, hence
country B always attracts FDI for any τB it sets. If the two roots exist, instead, they
will both be positive, but the only acceptable solution is the smaller one as the larger one
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violates the non-negative-profit-declaration condition, which requires τB < γΠB + tF .
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Therefore, country B always attracts FDI by setting
τ∗B (0) ≡ τˆB = γΠB + tF −
√
(γΠB + tF )
2 − 2γ (ΠB −ΠA)
and regional welfare is given by WRB,Tax = W
B
B = τˆB
(
ΠB − τˆB−tFγ
)
= ΠB − ΠA − τˆ
2
B
2γ
where the last equality is obtained by using f (0, τB) = 0.
The equilibrium of the tax-competition game between countries A and B can be
defined as follows:
τ∗A = , with  ∈ (0,∞)
τˆB : Π
B(τˆB) = Π
A (0)
Indeed, it is always possible for country B to set a tax rate such that country A can never
attract the foreign investor. Any τB > τˆB is not an equilibrium strategy for country B
as it gives country A the opportunity of attracting FDI with its best offer, i.e., τA = 0.
By contrast, any τB < τˆB would leave money to the firm. For country A, then, any
τA ∈ (0,∞) is a best reply to τˆB since A always earns a zero payoff.
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